of 1915, $50 million worth of war orders had been placed in Canada; twelve months later the total had soared to $600 million; by the end of 1916 the value of all war production in the country was estimated at close to $1.1 billion.
9
For employers these contracts meant massive profits, while to workers they brought jobs at last. By the end of 1915 there were 175,000 workers employed in war industries-over 100,000 of these in munitions work. During 1916 the figures jumped to 304,000 and 185,000 respectively. 10 The impact of this growing war industry on the country was extremely uneven as the location of munitions production was overwhelmingly concentrated in central Canada. As a result it was unions in the metal trades in Ontario and Quebec, especially the International Association of Machinists (1AM) which first registered the benefits of economic recovery. The I AM traced its American origin back to the late 1880s, and by the following decade had established numerous locals throughout Canada. Holding broad jurisdictional rights over workers labouring on machine tools, the union was especially well represented in metal fabrication plants and railway shops, precisely the workplaces which were transformed into armament suppliers during the war. 
19
From the start, then, Canadian manufacturers took advantage of the flooded labour market to employ workers in munitions industries at wages and conditions which were inferior to existing union standards. Battle-lines were thus quickly drawn for a major confrontation between organized labour and the combined force of business and government over the terms of employment in munitions industries. 16 Unions initially sought to redress their grievances by pressing for the inclusion of fair wage clauses in war production contracts. If this were done, manufacturers would be obliged to respect union standards of employ mentor forego contract awards. The TLC quickly took up this issue as a major legislative demand on the Borden government. The number of men involved in this war work has caused us, since the inception of the war in 1914, to exercise almost unlimited patience and accept uncalled for reductions of standard trade conditions. We felt the responsibility of allowing a stoppage of the work of this number of men from the essential industries mentioned and should such unfortunate circumstances occur that it would materially affect the success of the war. The men themselves feeling keenly the injustice done them had a natural desire to take the matters in their hands on many occasions, but up to the present, with very few exceptions, we have succeeded in preventing them from doing so. always holding out the hope of a more reasonable attitude being assumed by the Imperial Munitions Board toward us. 22 Accordingly, the Congress executive continued to rely on private meetings with the Borden government and Chairman Joseph Flavelle of the Imperial Munitions Board; on these occasions union leaders pledged their commitment to industrial stabil ity but appealed for concessions before matters went beyond their control.
23
Not surprisingly, neither Prime Minister Borden nor Flavelle was convinced of the need to capitulate to TLC lobbying. Their respective motives were instructive. Flavelle feared above all that the introduction of the fair wage clause would result in a strike by munitions employers, since it "would result in many manufacturers being unwilling to produce munitions, as it would set up new conditions for the labor in their works, and that rather than submit to interference between themselves and their workpeople they would refuse to produce munitions." 24 Furthermore, the success of union officials in preventing strike action in war industries only strengthened Flavelle" s view that no serious discontent existed. 23 Meanwhile, Borden rejected the TLC's call for a Fair Wages Board as unfeasible: a permanent Board, he feared, would be discredited as soon as it rendered a decision which either side objected to. were, as we shall see, audible rumblings of labour unrest in the munitions sector and the government hoped to stabilize the situation by extending the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act to cover all war production industries. Rather man placating labour, however, this move triggered an uproar of criticism. The Industrial Banner, for example, reacted with common bitterness: Deputation after deputation has waited upon the authorities at Ottawa, only to be put off with specious excuses, and now, when the workers have served notice that they do not propose to be any longer exploited by soulless contractors, lo! and behold! the Government takes action, not to protect the workers and remedy the evils they complain of. but to force them to remain at work even if, as many are doing, they are refused fair wages and working conditions."
Nor For a considerable lime after war broke out, Hamilton manufacturers were overlooked. However, a deputation went to Ottawa to interview the Government. and later Mr. Waddie was sent to Ottawa as special representative, for one week. The way was thus paved for the handsome orders which have since been received by the local manufacturers.** But in Hamilton, as elsewhere, complaints of poor wages and working conditions rapidly arose as almost a natural byproduct of armaments production. 33 During summer 1915 the I AM dispatched organizers to Hamilton and also tried to attract union activists to the city. "What we need is men who will talk unionism inside the shop to the man who works beside him," announced business agent Riley, "so if this should catch the eye of any boomer who has a hobby for organizing, let him make Hamilton and we will guarantee him plenty of work of both kinds." 34 The city's machine shops, now busily engaged in munitions manufacturing, thus became a priority of the IAM in its attempt to establish collective bargaining and union conditions. This campaign was facilitated by the spectacular growth of the city's war industries. By the fall of 1915 unemployment among city machinists had become a thing of the past. "The demand for war munitions is making work for every available machinist and toolmaker and the demand exceeds the supply," wrote Richard Riley in November 1915.
M At frequently held organizing meetings the IAM argued that trade unionism was the only means by which these newly-employed workers could get their fair share of munitions profits. compliance of employers with these demands: "We do not expect to experience much trouble in securing these conditions, as we have a strong organization in practically all of the shops and there are more jobs than there are men to fill them."
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The appearance of this schedule led to a special meeting of Hamilton's CMA branch at which a new committee was established to oversee labour relations. 42 From the start, then, the city's employers formed a united front in opposition to the union's demands. One Hamilton machinist described the "negotiations" over the lAM's proposal with his employer as follows: We went in and he asked us if we were in about that "thing" pointing to our schedule and when we replied that we were, he said that we must be in the pay of the Kaiser, and that the man who drew it up should be decorated with an iron cross. 50 Meanwhile the chief complaints of munitions workers revolved around the failure of wages to keep pace with the rising cost of living, and most important, the grinding toll of the lengthy working day which they were forced to work. The Hamilton Herald summarized the testimony of machinists in the city:
The evidence of the employees was to the effect that the men are dissatisfied mainly because the hours of work are ten to the day: that the machines are run at a higher speed than they were in times of peace, and that the consequent strain on their constitutions was too great to permit them to work ten hours a day.
81
The speed-up of industrial production, brought on by technological advances and the feverish compulsion of employers to maximize output in the The indignation of Hamilton's machinists, for their part, was only intensified by the realization that most members of their trade in Toronto had won the nine hour day, while in Buffalo a movement for the eight hour day was well underway. 84 Moreover, many machinists informed the commissioners in Hamilton that integrally linked to the question of hours was the issue of wages. As matters presently stood, they complained, machinists were often working over ten and 12Va hour shifts without any overtime payment; one individual informed the hearings of being compelled to work as many as 36 hours at a stretch. 85 In pressing for a standard nine hour work day with overtime rates thereafter, Hamilton machinists were activated by the desire for both increased wages and relief from the rigours of an intensified work process. For the duration of the war they pledged themselves willing to work as many hours as necessary, so long as overtime was paid after nine hours; meanwhile they would be secure in the knowledge that when peace returned and the requirements of production slackened, the nine hour day would be established as the norm. Together the demand for increased wages and lower hours of work instilled in Hamilton's machinists a sense of bitterness and militancy yet unprecedented in the war-time labour movement. This unity of purpose was not so strongly shared in the strikers' ranks. Once the strike began the IAM leadership was hamstrung by its commitment to responsible union behaviour. At a mass meeting of strikers on the first day of the strike, McClelland urged: "1 appeal to you men to act honorably ... it is up to you to see that there is no trouble. ** 7S At the same time his response to the news that machinists at one of the three city firms to accept the union's terms had nonetheless come out on sympathy strike was a blunt warning: "That sort of thing has got to stop." 76 By the second day of the strike another mass meeting further underlined the tension existing between the attitudes of strikers and union leaders. At the outset, Hamilton Mayor Walters asked the thousand strikers present whether they would return to work if the employers promised to enact the nine hour day after the war. The Industrial Banner described the response from the assembly as follows:
From all parts of the theatre came a tremendous chorus of no's and in order to refute the false assertions of the manufacturers that trouble had been fomented by agitators, it was shown that great dissatisfaction had been caused at the action of Vice-President McClelland for holding the men back from striking, as they had been in favor of coming out before. local press would be conciliatory and therefore a useful factor in resolving the dispute.* 3 However, it was soon apparent that references to the strike in Hamilton's newspapers were hardly serving a mediating function. Employers calling union leaders traitorous foreign agitators, and workers describing themselves as slaves to profit-hungry masters could hardly lay the basis for industrial harmony.
By the second day of the strike Prime Minister Borden, Labour Minister Crothers and 1MB Chairman Flavelle were all urging the Chief Press Censor to order a total ban on newspaper coverage of the Hamilton strike. This was essential. Chambers was informed, if sympathy walkouts were to be averted. 84 In Flavelle's opinion, strike coverage had to be stopped because "the labour situation was most critical, being in fact like a heap of gunpowder which a spark would explode."
85 After 14 June, the third day of the strike, the Industrial Banner was the only newspaper in the country to defy Chambers' order and maintain regular reporting of the strike. The compliance of the country's daily papers with the censorship ruling undoubtedly weakened the strikers' position. In addition to the union leadership's resistance to sympathetic strike action, the press blackout made it virtually impossible for workers outside Hamilton to organize support. Nor did the ban prevent the city's manufacturers from advertising in other parts of Canada and the United States for strikebreakers. In the absence of any news about the Hamilton dispute, these advertisements became a useful weapon in the employers' arsenal of anti-strike measures.
Ironically, the severe labour shortage which prevailed further undermined the strike, as many machinists took on new jobs at better wages and hours. Most left to work in Toronto's munitions plants since it was widely known that 53 plants there had agreements with terms superior to those being struck for in Hamilton; that ten were working according to these terms; and only three had inferior conditions. 88 Within the first two weeks of the strike alone, the Industrial Banner reported that between 300 and 400 strikers had left Hamilton for new jobs. betraying the strike. 98 Beyond this mutual campaign of vilification, the real catalyst behind the ASE's decision was an order from its parent organization in Britain to end the strike -in conformity with the no-strike pledge which the Society had given Uoyd George in March 1915** -or have its charter revoked! Accordingly, Hamilton's ASE organizer Fred Flatman announced that in compliance with Society policy, the Hamilton branch would henceforth stick to conciliation as the means of resolving its differences with employers.
90
In little over a month, then, the strikers 1 ranks were largely dissipated. Over 300 ASE members were back on the job and probably double that numberof strikers had left the city. Many of those unable to leave drifted back to their old jobs as they saw their numbers, but not the employers* hostility, diminish. On 22 July the Hamilton Herald reported only 100 machinists still on strike; by September the Labour Gazette's correspondent in Hamilton was able to report: "All the machinists have either returned at old conditions or 
